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Abstract 
Using data from 319 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 68 developing countries, we study the degree 
to which international debt investments are related to the financial and social performances of MFIs. 
We find that commercial investments are mainly related to financial performance and level of 
professionalisation of the MFIs. The targeting of women is not a priority, even though international 
commercial investors target MFIs that provide small loans. Subsidised investments, however, are 
mainly driven by the targeting of women, while financial performance and the level of 
professionalisation of the MFI is not a priority.  
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During the last decades, microfinance, the provision of banking services to poor families and 
micro-entrepreneurs, has evolved to become a global industry. Until recently, donations and 
subsidised loans have been the main source of funding for microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
Lately, however, the growth of the industry and the pressure by donors toward financial 
sustainability have motivated MFIs to turn to international capital markets. Moreover, 
international funding is regarded by many to be essential to fuel the growth of the sector, 
arguing that only international capital markets can handle the estimated US$200 billion 
needed to reach the potential demand for microfinance services worldwide (Swanson, 2008). 
Recent academic research (Mersland et al., 2011) has also shown that internationalisation, 
notable through investments, can have an overall positive influence on the social performance 
of MFIs. This is particularly interesting considering microfinance pertains to the field of 
social entrepreneurship, where balancing both economic and social outcomes is a constant 
challenge (Zahra et al., 2009). 
The funding of the microfinance industry has rapidly become a new specialised market. The 
development of specialised investment funds, called microfinance investment vehicles 
(MIVs), illustrates the emergence of this new, but heterogeneous, capital market. MFIs 
typically have both financial and social objectives (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010) and 
attract funding from donors with varying degrees of profit motivation. In the first survey of 
the microfinance investments market, Goodman (2004) identified three categories of MIVs: 
development funds, quasi-commercial funds and commercial funds. Goodman (2004) also 
identified a total of 43 MIVs holding US$1 billion under management. In 2011, Reille et al. 
(2011) estimated that 95 MIVs are in operation, with US$8 billion under management. Most 
international investments come in the form of loans to MFIs
3
, and according to Reille et al. 
(2009), the funding of MIVs come from public and private institutional investors (42%), 
individuals (34%), development institutions (21%) and other MIVs (3%). 
Those investing in MIVs are attracted by both social and financial returns (Reille et al., 2011). 
This paper examines whether MIVs’ investments matches the expectations of the investors by 
identifying which MFIs are being targeted by international funding. More specifically, using 
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data from 319 MFIs in 68 developing countries, we study whether there is a relationship 
between an MFI’s access to international commercial and subsidised debt and its financial 
and social performance. We find that access to commercial debt is related strong financial 
performance, a high level of professionalisation and a low average loan indicating outreach to 
poor customers. The targeting of women is not a priority for MFIs accessing international 
commercial debt. As for those MFIs accessing subsidised international debt they target female 
customers to a greater extent than other MFIs.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how the financial and social 
performances of MFIs influence the type of funding received, and it outlines the hypotheses to 
be tested. Section 3 explains the model, the methodology and the dataset used for estimations 
while Section 4 presents and discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. International funding and the performance of MFIs 
In this section we develop hypotheses on how international funding is associated with the 
financial and social performances of MFIs.  
 
2.1. The relationship between international funding and MFI performance 
 
As all MIVs claim to offer social returns to investors, they belong to the field of socially 
responsible investments (SRIs). Indeed, an SRI is “an investment process that integrates 
social, environmental and ethical considerations into investment decision making” 
(Renneboog el al., 2008). SRIs are strongly related to the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) of the firms in which they are invested. CSR is based on the idea that firms have 
ethical obligations and must respond appropriately to pressures from society (Carroll, 1979). 
Initially, CSR was limited to corporate philanthropy (Cochran, 2007). The concept then 
evolved into the idea that real social responsibility is not just donating money to charities, but 





The screening criteria for SRI funds depend on the selected approach between negative 
screening and positive screening (Renneboog et al., 2008; Juravle and Lewis, 2008; Bollen, 
2007). Negative screening involves a two step process. First, the investment horizon is 
defined by excluding specific fields or activities that investors consider “undesirable” (for 
instance, firms involved in weapons, alcohol or tobacco). Then, investments are selected by a 
financial risk/return analysis. The alternative approach, positive screening, does not exclude 
any field ex ante but selects investments because they meet higher performance levels in the 
desired criteria (e.g., high environmental or social performance). 
 
If the MIVs use a positive screening approach, we would expect to find a positive relationship 
between access to international funding and social performance in the MFI. However, if the 
MIVs use a negative screening approach, that is, they screen out all none microfinance 
investments and consider microfinance a social investment per se, we would then not expect 
to find any statistical relationship between access to international funding and the social 
results of the MFI but, rather, a positive relationship with financial performance.  
 
Based on the above, we propose the following general hypothesis posed in the alternative 
form:  
In the case of positive screening,  
H1a: The presence of international funding in an MFI is positively related to its social 
performance 
In the case of negative screening, 
H1b: There is no relationship between the presence of international funding in an MFI and its 
social performance  
To propose hypotheses on the relationship between the access to international investments 
and the MFI’s financial performance, we must understand that these investments can be split 
into two categories, namely, commercial funding and subsidised funding. Indeed, in his 
pioneer study on MIVs, Goodman (2004) lays out a framework illustrating the microfinance 
investment landscape as it, according to his analysis, should be4. In that landscape, 
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development-oriented investors finance socially oriented, although not financially sustainable, 
MFIs with grants or subsidised loans, while commercial investors fund financially well-
performing MFIs with loans and equity at market prices. Loans are labelled “commercial” 
when the MFI has to pay interest at the market rate, and the loan is labelled “subsidised” if the 
interest rate is below the market conditions (also referred to as a concessional loan). 
Therefore, we need to distinguish commercial from subsidised loans to understand their 
respective relationship with the social and financial performance of the MFI. 
 
2.2 Commercial funding and MFI performance 
We expect that international commercial investors invest in financially well-performing MFIs. 
Indeed, along with the growth of cross-border investments in microfinance, the sector has 
witnessed the increasing participation of commercial investors seeking market returns. 
Microfinance, at its best, has proven that it can generate profit and growth while being low 
risk (Swanson, 2008). MFIs can also be meaningful instruments for portfolio diversification. 
According to a study of MIV portfolios by Oehri & Fausch (2008), microfinance investments 
show low volatility and low correlation to other asset classes, which potentially makes 
microfinance an interesting asset to include in a portfolio for commercial investors.  
Building on business life-cycle theory, which states that the development of organisations 
depends on their capacity to access adapted funding sources (Little, 1974; Channon, 2006), 
several authors (Kooi, 2001; de Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 2004; Van Maanen, 2005; 
Bogan, 2008) argue that MFIs should be funded as follows: In the youth phase, MFIs need 
highly risk-tolerant subsidised capital in the form of grants and donated equity to support the 
early years of operation as MFIs are not sustainable enough to attract commercial funding. In 
the growth phase, MFIs must increase their scale and gain market shares with retained 
earnings and subsidised loans as the main sources of funding. This stage is also when, by 
complying with stricter banking regulations and transparency standards, MFIs can make the 
transition from non-profit organisations to regulated institutions so that they can then mobilise 
deposits and have easier access to commercial funding. Regarding this specific issue, Bogan 
(2008) notes that this transition to regulation is an expensive and difficult process that 
requires subsidised funding. Consequently, many large and established MFIs continue to 
receive support to finance the transition in the form of grants and subsidised loans along with 
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risk capital provided primarily by socially oriented investors. The last stage of the lifecycle is 
maturity, a stage when the MFIs are formal regulated banks with capital structures similar to 
those of commercial banks (Bogan, 2008). Thus, mature MFIs should be funded mostly by 
deposits, local capital markets and international commercial investors.   
Taken together, commercial international funding should be positively related to the financial 
performance of the MFI, as outlined in this second hypothesis: 
H2: The presence of international commercial funding in an MFI is positively related to its 
financial performance 
 
2.3 Subsidised funding and MFI performance  
 
As for subsidised funding, the lifecycle theory predicts that MFIs in their early stages need 
subsidised funding to compensate for their lack of profitability. We could, therefore, expect 
that international subsidised funding is negatively related to the MFI’s financial performance. 
However, the relationship might not be that clear cut. The SRI literature provides insight into 
what type of MFIs the socially oriented investors would typically target. As previously 
outlined in section 2.1, social investors put their money into projects that yield the highest 
social benefits. However, socially oriented investors also intend to ensure good economic 
performance from their investments (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Therefore, MIVs claim to 
have “double bottom line” objectives, and thus they invest in socially and financially sound 
MFIs. Moreover, De Schrevel et al. (2009) indicate that the rapid growth of MIVs between 
2004 and 2008 is explained by a narrow targeting of the most profitable and professional 
MFIs. This could indicate that there is a positive relationship between access to subsidised 
funding and the financial performance of the MFI. 
 
To summarise, we propose the following two alternative hypotheses for the relationship 
between international subsidised funding in an MFI and the MFI’s financial performance: 
H3a: The presence of international subsidised funding in an MFI is negatively related to its 
financial performance  
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H3b: The presence of international subsidised funding in an MFI is positively related to its 
financial performance  
We now set up a model that links a set of variables composed of financial and social 
performance indicators to the type of international funding received by MFIs. 
 
 
2.4 Definitions of the variables 
 
To proxy the MFI’s financial performance, we use the return on assets (ROA), the operating 
expense ratio, and the 30-day portfolio-at-risk (SEEP Network, 2005).  
The ROA indicates how well the MFI is able to generate profit from its assets and is 
calculated as (Net Operating Income – Taxes) / Average Annual Assets. 
The operating expense ratio, calculated as (Operating expenses/Average loan portfolio), 
measures how well the MFI masters its operations (Jansson, 2003). Potential funders can use 
this indicator to better assess the robustness of an MFI’s activities with a lower level of 
operating expenses indicating that the MFI is more efficient than one with higher operating 
expenses in the same local context. 
The portfolio quality is crucial as the loan portfolio is the main source of risk for any financial 
institution. Loan portfolios of MFIs are their largest assets, and the risk associated with poor 
management of the portfolio can be dramatic, especially since microloans are generally not 
backed with bankable collateral (Jansson, 2003). The most used indicator of portfolio quality 
in the industry is the portfolio at risk (most generally PAR30), which measures the share of 
the MFI’s outstanding loan portfolio with more than 30 days in arrears.  
 
Social performance in microfinance is defined as "The effective translation of an institution's 
social mission into practice in line with accepted social values such as serving larger 
numbers of poor and excluded people; improving the quality and appropriateness of financial 
services; creating benefits for clients; and improving social responsibility of an MFI" 
(www.sptf.info). Obtaining measurable and trustable MFI’s data with respect to this 
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qualitative definition of social performance is difficult. Consequently, the following measures 
have been used extensively in the microfinance literature.  
 
The average loan size (weighted by GNI per capita) (e.g., Lensink et al., 2011; Mersland and 
Strøm, 2010; Cull et al., 2007; De Bruyne, 2008). According to Schreiner (2002), a lower 
loan size indicates that the MFI reaches out to poorer customers. To ensure comparability 
between countries, we take the average loan size as a percentage of per capita gross national 
income (GNI).  
 
The targeting of women (e.g., De Bruyne, 2008, D’Espallier et al., 2011; Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). We use a time-invariant dummy that indicates 
whether the MFI has a conscious bias toward lending to women as indicated in the rating 
reports (D’Espallier et al., 2011).  
 
The rural outreach (De Bruyne, 2008, Mersland and Strøm, 2010). We use a dummy variable 
defining whether the MFI serves rural markets. As rural areas are generally in financial need 
and more difficult for MFIs to penetrate, better rural outreach can be considered an indicator 
of higher social performance. 
 
We also include a number of control variables that could influence whether an international 
MIV would lend to an MFI. First, we include institution-specific controls that could 
potentially influence the access to international funding: size (logarithm of MFI assets); age 
(number of years since start-up of MFI); a dummy stating whether the MFI was originated by 
an international initiator, as Mersland et al. (2011) show international orientation can have an 
impact on social performance of MFIs; a dummy indicating whether the MFI mobilise 
voluntary savings; and the level of professionalisation proxied by a dummy for the presence 
of an internal auditor reporting to the board. We then include context variables: the human 
development index to control for development differences across countries and regional 
dummies to capture differences across regions (Latin America, MENA region, EECA region, 
Asia and Africa). 
 
2.5 The model   
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To investigate to which type of MFI the international funding is being channelled, we use a 
pooled cross-section probit estimation method (further explained in section 3). We estimate 
three regressions. In one regression, the dependent variable is a dummy stating whether the 
MFI holds international debt at all, and in the other two, the dependent variable distinguishes 
whether the MFI has international commercial debt or subsidised debt. 
 
2.5.1 International investments 
Pr(International debt = 1) = Φ (β0 + β1 ROA + β2 Opexp + β3 Par30 + β4 Avloan + β5 
dmWomen + β6 dmrural + β7 Size + β8 Age + β9 dmIntInit + β10 dmSavings + β11 dmaudit + β12 
HDI + β13 dmLatAm + β14 dmMena + β15 dmEECA + β16 dmASIA)  
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.  
 
2.5.2 Commercial funding 
Pr(International commercial debt = 1) = Φ (β0 + same variables) 
 
2.5.3 Subsidised funding 




3. Data and estimation methodology 
 
3.1 Dataset and descriptive statistics 
The dataset comprises up to five years of data from 319 MFIs in 68 developing countries. The 
information has been compiled from risk assessment reports prepared by five rating agencies 
specialising in microfinance: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. 
Comparisons of the methodologies applied by the rating agencies reveal no major differences 
in MFI assessment relevant for variables included in this study. The dataset has a certain 
sample selection bias as only rated MFIs are included. They represent international oriented 
MFIs with the intention to practice microfinance in a business-oriented manner, and they have 
the greatest likelihood of achieving the dual goal of social and financial performance.  
The rating agencies differ in their emphasis and in the abundance of available information. 
Thus, different number of observations on different variables in different years is reported. 
The rating reports comprising the data used for this study are from 2001 to 2008, with the vast 
majority from 2005 to 2008.  
 
A total of 65% of the MFIs in our sample have international debt. Of those having 
international debt 30% have only commercial debt, 42% have only subsidised debt, and 28% 
have both types of debt. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study. The average ROA is 
1% with a standard deviation of 13%, while the operating expense ratio is 36%, illustrating 
the high cost of microlending. The average PAR30 is 7% with a standard deviation of 11%.  
With respect to social performance, the average loan size represents, on average, 57% of the 
gross national income per capita in the country, 46% of the MFIs have a bias in favour of 
targeting women and 23% operate only in rural areas. The average MFI has been operating 
for nine years. Only 24% of the MFIs collect voluntary savings, which suggests that sample 
MFIs are primarily non-regulated institutions. As for geographical distribution, Latin America 
represents 45% of the observations followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 21%.   
  




Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables. High correlations among explicative 
variables can indicate a multicollinearity problem. According to Kennedy (2008), correlations 
must be at least 0.8 to detect collinearity among variables. In this case, correlations among 
explicative variables are quite low.  
 
<Table 2 about there> 
 
3.2 Estimation methods 
To determine which type of performance is associated with MFIs receiving international 
investments, we estimate two pooled probit regressions (Stock & Watson, 2006). This type of 
model allows us to observe the effect of a change in the explicative variables on the 
dependant variable expressed in terms of probability. In probit regressions, the coefficients of 
the explicative variables cannot be interpreted as marginal effects on the dependent variable, 
and their signs show whether the corresponding variable influences positively or negatively 
the likelihood for the dependent variable to equal 1. Coefficients are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method (Stock & Watson, 2006). A most used measure of fit for models 
with binary dependent variables is the pseudo-R
2
, which compares the values of the maximum 
likelihood function of all regressors to the value of the likelihood with no regressors.  
As the data have a panel structure but the two dependent variables (commercial debt and 
subsidised debt) were reported only for the last year in the rating reports, we assume them to 
be constant over time. This assumption is natural as MFIs tend to keep international debt once 
received. In addition, the assumption corresponds to the reality behind investments as 
investors include historical performance when making their funding decisions. Therefore, we 
run cross-section pooled regressions. In all regressions, we use robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroskedasticity. Data have also been tested and treated for outliers using 
Grubbs’ test (Iglewicz and Hoaglin, 1993). Finally, we run regressions with and without the 
regional control variables.  
 




4.1 Univariate statistics 
 
As a starting point, we compare the different groups of MFIs according to the type of 
international debt they have. We split our sample into three groups
5
: MFIs without any 
international debt, MFIs with international commercial debt only, and MFIs with international 
subsidised debt only. We first want to know if there is any difference in performance among 
these groups. For this, we use a one-way ANOVA analysis. We test the significance of 
variance differences among our three groups, regarding each financial and social performance 
variable. 
 
Our null hypothesis is: 
H0: There is no difference among the performances of the three groups of MFIs. 
 
Our alternative hypothesis is: 
Ha: There is a difference among the performances of the three groups of MFIs. 
 
<Table 3 about there> 
 
The outcome of the one-way ANOVA is presented in Table 3. The significant F statistic 
shows that for the variables ROA, PAR30, Women bias and Rural market, there is a 
significant difference in performance among the three groups. However, the ANOVA does 
not show where the differences are. To determine this, we run mean comparison tests pairwise 
between the three groups.  
 
<Table 4 about there> 
 
The results in table 4.1 illustrate that MFIs receiving international funding significantly differ 
from other MFIs. MFIs holding international debt (either commercial or subsidised) show, on 
average, a greater focus on women and rural areas. Regarding financial performance, Par30 is 
significantly lower in MFIs holding international debt. Those MFIs are also more 
professionally structured (proxied by the presence of an internal auditor), and not surprisingly, 
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they are more international (more likely to have an international initiator) and are less likely 
to offer voluntary savings to their clients. Surprisingly, ROA and operating expense ratio do 
not distinguish between MFIs with and without international debt.  
 
Table 4.2 compares MFIs holding only international commercial debt to MFIs without any 
international debt. The results are similar to those in table 4.1, except that the significantly 
greater focus on women, as seen in table 4.1, is not evidenced in MFIs holding only 
commercial debt. In addition, commercial debt is more common in younger MFIs. In table 
4.3, we compare MFIs holding only international subsidised debt to MFIs without any 
international debt. Interestingly, we observe that the ROA is significantly lower in MFIs with 
subsidised debt, even if the PAR30 is also lower (but still higher than the average PAR30 of 
commercial debt holders). Those MFIs with subsidised debt are also more oriented towards 
women and rural areas. Finally, table 4.4 compares MFIs with only commercial debt to MFIs 
with only subsidised debt. The significant average differences show that compared to MFIs 
with subsidised debt, those with commercial debt have a higher financial performance in 
terms of higher ROA and lower PAR30, but they have a lower social performance, that is, a 
lower focus on women and rural areas. 
 
In sum, the mean comparison tests show that commercial funding targets the more 
professional, financially well-performing and less socially performing MFIs, while the 
opposite is the case for subsidised debt. In the next sub-section we use a probit estimation 
method to see whether our findings hold in a multivariate setting. 
 
 
4.2 Linking MFI performance and access to international funding  
 
Table 5 shows the general model for international debt, regardless of the type of debt. This 
table (as well as tables 6 and 7) is composed of three regressions that correspond to different 
robustness checks. Column 1 tests the financial and social performance variables only, 
column 2 includes controls but not regional dummies, and column 3 adds the regional 
dummies. 
 




Results of the general model show that three factors drive access to international debt: a 
higher average loan size, a smaller total asset size and the presence of an international 
initiator. Surprisingly, no financial performance variable explains the access to international 
debt. An international initiator is, indeed, more likely to provide the necessary contacts to the 
MFIs for access to international funding (Mersland et al., 2011), while higher loan sizes can 
lead to a more cost-efficient structure (Lensink et al., 2011), which can also attract 
international funders. However, these general results do not tell much about the relationship 
between the type of funding received and the performance of the MFI (H1a and H1b) as the 
effects could be very different from one type of funding to another. We therefore disentangle 
the international debt variable into two distinct variables: international commercial debt only, 
and international subsidised debt only
6
.   
 
Table 6 shows the regressions for international commercial debt.  
 
<Table 6 about there> 
 
Beginning with the relationship between access to commercial debt and financial performance 
(H2), our expectations are supported. Indeed, a higher ROA, lower operating expense ratio 
and lower PAR30 significantly increase the likelihood for an MFI to have international 
commercial debt. This finding is consistent with the notion that commercial investors target 
more robust and profitable MFIs (Bogan, 2008; Goodman, 2004). This also confirms the 
observation made by many that MIVs target the “niche” of financially profitable MFIs (De 
Schrevel et al., 2009; Wiesner and Quien, 2010). 
 
Regarding social performance, lower average loan sizes increase the likelihood of commercial 
debt for the MFI. Indeed, all microfinance funders declare that social performance matters. 
The average loan size is the most used and one of the easiest social indicators to gather about 
an MFI (Urgeghe, 2010). We find a significant negative relationship between the presence of 
commercial funding and the targeting of women by the MFI. Thus, commercial MIVs care 
about reaching the poor but do not consider reaching women a priority.  
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Control variables show that having an internal auditor reporting to the Board significantly 
increases the likelihood of accessing commercial funding, which is in line with the lifecycle 
theory and the expectations of professional investors regarding investees’ institutional 
stability. 
 
Table 7 shows the regressions for international subsidised debt. 
 
<Table 7 about there> 
First, regarding financial performance, the negative sign of the ROA coefficient indicates that 
subsidised funding is channelled to MFIs with weak financial performance. However, this 
relationship is only significant in one out of three regressions. The striking observation is the 
difference compared to MFIs with commercial debt. While financial performance explains 
much of the access to commercial funding, this is not the case for subsidised funding as the 
major drivers are the targeting of women, higher average loans sizes and less formal structure 
(cf. Internal auditor variable). The average loan size positive sign is the opposite of expected. 
While commercial debt goes to MFIs reaching poor customers (lower average loan size) 
subsidised debt goes to MFIs reaching less poor customers (higher average loan size). The 
most probable reason for this is that lending to the poor can indeed be good business for the 
MFI – low average loans and strong financial performance can be combined (Mersland and 
Strøm, 2010) -  and that MIVs providing subsidized debt are most concerned about supporting 
weak MFIs, especially when these reach out to women. This could mean that the targeting of 
women, and not necessarily the targeting of the poor, is what attracts subsidies in 
microfinance.  
Control variables show that an international initiator is significantly and positively associated 
with subsidised funding. Not surprisingly, international linkages pay off in the form of access 
to subsidies. The results for MFI age lead to an interesting observation: older MFIs receive 
more subsidised debt than they receive commercial debt. These findings indicate that 
subsidised funding stick with some older MFIs instead of reaching younger MFIs as indicated 
by several policy makers (e.g. de Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 2004). Instead our results 
show that young MFIs access commercial debt and probably, after some years, shift to other 
sources of funds such as deposits or local banks. Finally, the last control variables reveal what 
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seems to be of high importance in explaining the segmentation of funding to MFIs, that is, 
level of professionalisation. The presence of an internal auditor reporting to the board is 
positively related to commercial funding and negatively related to subsidised funding. In a 
previous study by Mersland and Strøm (2009), having an internal auditor was one of the few 
governance variables with significant performance influence.  
 
In sum, this analysis suggests that even if the international funding to MFIs comes from 
socially responsible investors, we need to distinguish between commercial and subsidised 
funding to understand MIVs practices. Commercial funding seems to be clearly driven by 
financial performance and the level of professionalisation of the MFI, while the targeting of 
women is clearly not a priority, even though they target institutions that provide smaller loans 
to their clients. This seems to match the negative screening approach – microfinance is per se 
considered a social investment so MIVs offering commercial debt can concentrate on 
analysing the level of professionalization and financial performance of the MFI. On the other 
hand, subsidised funding seems to clearly target institutions focusing on women without 
prioritising level of professionalization or financial performance. Thus, subsidised providers 
of debt seem to follow a positive approach but mainly limited to the targeting of women. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Starting with the statement that international funders of microfinance claim to pursue both 
financial and social bottom lines through their investments, this paper tests what type of 
characteristics and performance in an MFI actually attracts international investments, 
segmented into commercial and subsidised debt. The overall conclusion is that commercial 
funding seems to match the negative screening approach as it is mainly driven by financial 
performance and the level of professionalisation of the MFIs, while subsidised funding is 
mainly driven by the targeting of women and not by the level of professionalization or 
financial performance of the MFI. Thus, subsidised loan providers seem to follow a positive 
approach in their investments. 
 
By applying financial criteria to select MFIs, commercial funding seems to consider those 
institutions, per se, part of the social investment horizon. As a result, any MFI that can 
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demonstrate a good level of professionalisation and a good financial return is likely to attract 
international commercial investments. The results also indicate that operational efficiency, 
such as a lower operating expense ratio and a lower portfolio at risk matter for commercial 
investors. Again, this shows that commercial microfinance investors consider the level of 
professionalization to be important as operating efficiency measures the degree to which the 
MFI masters its processes (Mersland and Strøm, 2010).  
 
Two important policy implications can be drawn from this paper. First, MFIs should 
professionalise their operations and assure strong financial performance in order to attract 
international commercial funding. Second, MIVs providing subsidised funding need to 
rethink their targeting strategy. Even though the subsidised MFIs reach women to a larger 
extent that non-subsidised MFIs it may easily lead to a dependency trap if the subsidisation 
continue over several years as found in this paper. In addition, also subsidised MFIs should be 
concerned about their operational efficiency.  
This paper is only a first step in understanding the drivers of international microfinance 
investments, and it has some limitations which should motivate more research. First, rough 
dummies are used to distinguish between MFIs with or without subsidised or commercial 
international debt. More information on the relative importance of each debt type as well as 
more information about the individual MIVs could potentially improve considerably the 
analyses. Thus, researchers could build a dataset where they combine variables from MIVs 
and MFIs. Second, we should be cautious in the way we measure social performance. Even 
though the three variables applied in this study (average loan size, targeting women and rural 
outreach) are widely used in academic and practitioner studies they are still only rough 
proxies of social performance. Social performance has a more qualitative nature and embraces 
many other aspects of the MFI activity, such as social responsibility and the interactions with 
various stakeholders of the MFI. Thus, how investors actually assess social performance in 
MFIs remains to a large extent “a black box” for future research to open. In addition, 
researchers should assess to what extent international investors consider operational 
efficiency to be a social variable. Finally, the causality direction could be reversed for 
variables such as internal auditor as debt holders can demand MFIs to hire an internal auditor 
as a condition for their funding. Event studies where ex-ante and ex-post performance is 
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compared in relation to the installation of new governance mechanisms, like an internal 
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Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Financial performance         
ROA 820 0.00 0.13 -0.99 0.34 
Operating expense ratio 813 0.36 0.51 0.02 11.32 
Portfolio at risk 790 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.97 
      Social performance 
     Average loan/GNI per capita 690 0.57 1.00 0.00 11.75 
Women-targeting 845 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Dummy rural market 837 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
      Control variables 
     Logarithm of assets 840 14.63 1.26 10.60 18.26 
MFI age  856 9.04 7.05 0.00 43.00 
Dummy international initiator 852 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Dummy voluntary savings 856 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Dummy internal auditor 733 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
HDI 856 0.69 0.13 0.37 0.87 
 




America Africa Asia EECA MENA Total 
 
        Commercial debt 97 38 13 40 4 192 20% 
Subsidised debt 98 45 60 49 15 267 27% 
Both types of debt 87 15 13 57 11 183 19% 
No international debt 161 69 34 55 19 338 34% 
        Total 443 167 120 201 49 980 
 




Table 2: Correlations  
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
             1 - ROA 1 
          2 - Operating expense ratio -0.3592 1 
         3 - Portfolio at risk (30 days) -0.1899 -0.0826 1 
        4 - Average loan/GNI per capita 0.0457 -0.142 0.0528 1 
       5 - Women-targeting 0.0415 -0.0176 -0.071 -0.1289 1 
      6 - Dummy rural market -0.1972 0.151 -0.0026 0.1353 -0.0473 1 
     7 - Logarithm of assets 0.2187 -0.1801 -0.0584 0.1535 -0.0704 -0.1068 1 
    8 - MFI age  0.0453 -0.1474 0.2522 0.0335 -0.1223 -0.1168 0.2354 1 
   9 - Dummy international initiator -0.1122 0.1181 -0.1766 -0.0309 0.2152 0.0139 0.0119 -0.2158 1 
  10 - Savings -0.0334 -0.124 0.1656 0.0462 -0.0619 0.1002 0.2171 0.2726 -0.2033 1 







Table 3: One way ANOVA 
  
Analysis of Variance             
Groups: no debt, commercial debt, subsidised debt 
    




Exp. Ratio Par30 
Av. 
Loan/GNI Women bias 
Rural 
market 
       
       Variance between groups 0.14795714 0.607170856 0.163420289 2.45033413 7.61874294 3.71340111 
Variance within groups 12.6628549 208.04978 7.95579943 628.060553 187.705272 130.86683 
F stat 4.43 1.1 7.49 1.24 15.91 11.01 
Prob > F 0.0122** 0.3348 0.0006*** 0.2888 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
              
 













International debt No international debt 
Z-stat 
    
 
Mean Std Mean Std 
  
  
ROA 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.12 -0.72 
Op. expense ratio 0.37 0.60 0.34 0.41 0.82 
PAR 30 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.12 -3.11 * 
Average loan/GNI per 
capita 0.59 1.14 0.49 0.74 1.25 
Women-targeting 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 2.44 * 
Dummy rural market 0.27 0.45 0.15 0.36 4.28 * 
Logarithm of assets 14.55 1.18 14.70 1.35 -1.54 
MFI age  8.70 6.54 9.39 7.92 -1.31 
International initiator 0.48 0.50 0.31 0.46 4.77 * 
Voluntary savings 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.46 -3.50 * 
Internal auditor 0.43 0.50 0.35 0.48 2.17 * 
Significance level: *10% 
     
      
      






Commercial debt only No international debt 
Z-stat 
    
 
Mean Std Mean Std 
  
  
ROA 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 1.15 
Op. expense ratio 0.34 0.23 0.34 0.41 -0.26 
PAR 30 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12 -4.66 * 
Average loan/GNI per 
capita 0.52 0.77 0.49 0.74 0.40 
Women-targeting 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.49 -1.18 
Dummy rural market 0.22 0.42 0.15 0.36 2.04 * 
Logarithm of assets 14.52 1.17 14.70 1.35 -1.57 
MFI age  7.97 4.86 9.39 7.92 -2.55 * 
International initiator 0.43 0.50 0.31 0.46 2.75 * 
Voluntary savings 0.13 0.33 0.31 0.46 -5.26 * 
Internal auditor 0.55 0.50 0.35 0.48 4.35 * 
Significance level: *10% 
     
      
















Subsidised debt only No international debt 
Z-stat 
    
 
Mean Std Mean Std 
  
  
ROA -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 -2.04 * 
Op. expense ratio 0.40 0.76 0.34 0.41 1.08 
PAR 30 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 -1.66 * 
Average loan/GNI per 
capita 0.63 1.36 0.49 0.74 1.35 
Women-targeting 0.59 0.49 0.41 0.49 4.57 * 
Dummy rural market 0.31 0.46 0.15 0.36 4.59 * 
Logarithm of assets 14.58 1.19 14.70 1.35 -1.13 
MFI age  9.22 7.49 9.39 7.92 -0.27 
International initiator 0.51 0.50 0.31 0.46 4.92 * 
Voluntary savings 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46 -1.55 
Internal auditor 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 -0.53 
Significance level: *10% 
     
      
      






Commercial debt only Subsidised debt only 
Z-stat 
    
 
Mean Std Mean Std 
  
  
ROA 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.13 2.72 * 
Op. expense ratio 0.34 0.23 0.40 0.76 -1.27 
PAR 30 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.11 -2.55 * 
Average loan/GNI per 
capita 0.52 0.77 0.63 1.36 -0.98 
Women-targeting 0.35 0.48 0.59 0.49 -5.11 * 
Dummy rural market 0.22 0.42 0.31 0.46 -2.08 * 
Logarithm of assets 14.52 1.17 14.58 1.19 -0.53 
MFI age  7.97 4.86 9.22 7.49 -2.16 * 
International initiator 0.43 0.50 0.51 0.50 -1.59 
Voluntary savings 0.13 0.33 0.25 0.43 -3.52 * 
Internal auditor 0.55 0.50 0.32 0.47 -4.51 * 
Significance level: *10% 




          Pooled probit regressions for International Debt 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
        
ROA 0.226 0.561 0.722 
    Operating expense ratio 0.263 0.235 0.159 
    PAR30 -0.608 -0.578 -0.820 
    Average loan/GNI per capita 0.0959* 0.160*** 0.172** 
    Women-targeting 0.116 -0.0204 -0.137 
    Dummy rural market 0.349** 0.198 0.127 
    Logarithm of assets 
 
-0.171*** -0.164*** 
    MFI age  
 
0.0110 0.00633 
    Dummy international initiator 
 
0.226** 0.298** 
    Voluntary savings 
 
-0.0844 -0.285* 
    Dummy internal auditor 
 
-0.0133 0.0196 
    HDI 
  
0.0353 
    Region dummies No No Yes 
    Constant -0.294** 2.097*** 2.499*** 
    Pseudo R2 0.0177 0.0373 0.0630 
    Observations 678 604 604 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
Notes:  
Region dummies are included for Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia,  
Middle East and North Africa, and Asia.  
    
A robustness check (unreported) has been conducted by running the same regressions using a logit 







Pooled probit regressions for International Commercial Debt 
  [1] [2] [3] 
        
ROA 1.586** 1.196 1.688** 
    Operating expense ratio -0.0182 -0.485* -1.018*** 
    PAR30 -2.440*** -2.024*** -1.982** 
    Average loan/GNI per capita -0.0429 -0.122** -0.207*** 
    Women-targeting -0.409*** -0.322** -0.287* 
    Dummy rural market  0.145 0.201 0.448** 
    Logarithm of assets 
 
-0.112* -0.107* 
    MFI age  
 
-0.00417 -0.00904 




    Voluntary savings 
 
-0.658*** -0.934*** 
    Dummy internal auditor 
 
0.622*** 0.627*** 
    HDI 
  
-0.208 
    Region dummies No No Yes 
    Constant -0.339*** 1.263 2.300** 
    Pseudo R2 0.0445 0.114 0.177 
    Observations 539 482 482 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1       
    Notes:  
Region dummies are included for Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia,  
Middle East and North Africa, and Asia.  
    
A robustness check (unreported) has been conducted by running the same regressions using a 







Pooled probit regressions for International Subsidised Debt 
  [1] [2] [3] 
        
ROA -1.059* -0.498 -0.671 
    Operating expense ratio 0.0865 0.23 0.432 
    PAR30 -0.11 -0.183 -0.144 
    Average loan/GNI per capita 0.127** 0.224*** 0.284*** 
    Women-targeting 0.549*** 0.337*** 0.316** 
    Dummy rural market  0.265* 0.248 0.0303 
    Logarithm of assets 
 
-0.0355 -0.0274 
    MFI age  
 
0.0206** 0.0211** 
    Dummy international initiator 
 
0.235* 0.301** 
    Voluntary savings 
 
0.112 0.213 
    Dummy internal auditor 
 
-0.395*** -0.419*** 
    HDI 
  
-0.618 
    Region dummies No No Yes 
    Constant -0.843*** -0.527 -0.778 
    Pseudo R2 0.0533 0.0706 0.103 
    Observations 539 482 482 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Notes:  
Region dummies are included for Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia,  
Middle East and North Africa, and Asia.  
    
A robustness check (unreported) has been conducted by running the same regressions using a 
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